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COMMENT
MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE VERDICT:
EVIDENCE DEFICIENCIES
1. THE MOTION IN GENERAL
After the verdict has been rendered in a trial court in Virginia, there
are many paths open to the party against whom the verdict has been
rendered. One of these paths is the motion to set aside the verdict of
the jury on the grounds that it is contrary to the evidence or without
evidence to support it, and to enter up final judgment for the moving
party.' This motion has had a long and interesting history in the courts
of the state of Virginia. We shall begin with a brief study of the use
and effect of the motion prior to 1919, then move on to its increased
use and effects from the revision of the Virginia Code in 1919 to the
motion as it is used in the Virginia Courts in 1964.
Prior to the revision of the Code in 1919 the motion to set aside the
verdict on the grounds that it was contrary to the evidence (or without
evidence to support it) was merely another means by which the dissatis-
fied party could obtain a new trial. The motion could result in no other
action. The law as it stood prior to 1919 was to the effect that when
the verdict of a jury in a civil action was set aside by a trial court upon
the grounds that it was contrary to the evidence (or without evidence
to support it), a new trial had to be granted. The most serious difficulty
offered by the motion in this early period was the proper definition of
the phrases "contrary to the evidence" and "without evidence to sup-
port it." 2
With the important revision of the Virginia Code in 1919, the motion
to set aside the verdict because contrary to the evidence (or without evi-
dence to support it) became more significant in the field of courtroom
law. In 1919 the Code Revisors Committee recommended and the Vir-
ginia General Assembly adopted, a statute which materially altered the
effect of a motion to set aside a verdict because contrary to the evidence
or without evidence to support it. The statute read as follows:
When the verdict of a jury in a civil action is set aside by a trial
1. BUaKs, PLEADING AND PRAcrIcE 616 (4th ed. 1952).
2. BURKS, PLEADING AND PRAcCE 604 (4th ed. 1952).
[ 2161
MOTION TO SET ASIDE
court upon the ground that it is contrary to the evidence, or without
evidence to support it, a new trial shall not be granted if there is suf-
ficient evidence before the court to enable it to decide the case upon
its merits, but such final judgment shall be entered as to the court
shall seem right and proper. If necessary to assess damages which have
not been assessed, the court may empanel a jury at its bar to make
such assessment, and then enter such final judgment.
Nothing in this section contained shall be construed to give to trial
courts any greater power over verdicts than they now have under
existing rules of procedure, nor t6 impair the right to move for a new
trial on the ground of after discovered evidence.3
The object of this section, the revisors said, was to put an end to the
action, thereby putting the losing party to his writ of error. In this
way they felt they would avoid the unnecessary delay and expense of
a second trial. Since by its terms this statute allowed a court to set
aside a verdict handed down by a jury and enter a final judgment of its
own, it was only a matter of time before its constitutionality was ques-
tioned. For was this not in effect a denial of the right to be tried by
jury? In June 1921 this question was presented to the Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals in the case of Forbes and Company v. Southern Cotton
Oil Company.4 The court, after considering the matter of the constitu-
tional guarantee of the right to trial by jury, upheld the statute. The
court said its decision was influenced by several factors. One of these
was the fact that the members of the Revision Committee of the Code
of 1919 had been carefully selected for their work. It was presumed
that they gave the statute their careful consideration in drafting and
submitting it to the General Assembly, including their deliberate judg-
ment as to its constitutional validity. Adding to this the factor of the
legislature's judgment in adopting it, the court felt that ".... this court
ought not to pronounce the section unconstitutional unless it is plainly
so-so plainly as to leave no doubt on the subject." I
The Revisor's Committee of 1919 felt that this statute would also take
effect in another form, that of a substitute for the demurrer to the
evidence. Since the motion to strike the evidence has evolved in Vir-
ginia, it has almost completely replaced the demurrer to the evidence.
Therefore we will contrast this motion with the motion to set aside the
verdict because contrary to the evidence or without evidence to support
3. VA. CODE AN. § 8-352 (1950) (Replacement Volume 1957).
4. 130 Va. 245, 108 S.E. 15 (1921).
5. Id. at 257.
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it, for it was felt that this motion could and would be used as a sub-
stitute. It has been held in Virginia that in a civil case the defendant or
the plaintiff have an option in testing the sufficiency of their opponents
evidence. They may make a motion to strike the evidence at the con-
clusion of the opponent's evidence or at the conclusion of all the evidence,
or they may await the verdict of the jury and then make a motion to
set aside the verdict because contrary to the evidence (or without evi-
dence to support it).6 The question then arises as to which of the mo-
tions is to be pursued. To determine which motion would be best
suited to counsel's intended purpose, the individual facts of each case
must be examined. Courts are more apt to say that a jury could not
have drawn a particular inference from the evidence had it been sub-
mitted to them, than if they are to set aside a verdict after the jury had
already drawn the inference. But the motion to strike the evidence
indicates a possible weakness in the case presented and will give counsel's
adversary an opportunity to take a nonsuit or to introduce additional
evidence. If, however, counsel waits, not making the motion to strike
and the jury finds against him; if his adversary has failed to prove his
case and he moves to set aside the verdict; it is too late for his adversary
to do anything.7 There are advantages to each motion, and as it was
stated before, the selection must depend on the individual facts of the
case. In regard to their appropriateness as a vehicle for testing the
sufficiency of the evidence, it has been held that each is separate and dis-
tinct. As the court said in Gabbard v. Knight ". . . whether or not
there has been a motion to strike the evidence, the motion to set aside the
verdict because contrary to the evidence may be used as an appropriate
means of testing the sufficiency of the evidence." 8
II. WHEN SHOULD A VERDICT BE SET ASIDE UNDER 8-352?
It was distinctly stated in the writing of the statute in the 1919 Code,
that the courts would have no greater power over verdicts than they
had before the enactment of the statute. Therefore, before a court could
proceed under the new statute, it had to determine whether it could
have properly set aside a verdict under the law as established by court
decisions prior to the enactment of this statute. Again the old question
of defining the terms "contrary to the evidence" or "without evidence
to support it," haunted the courtroom. Since there was no statutory law
6. Seinsheimer Co. v. Greenaway, 159 Va. 528, 166 S.E. 539 (1932).
7. BumKS, PLEADING AND PRACTICE 606 (4th ed. 1952).
8. 202 Va. 40, 116 S.E.2d 73 (1960).
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on the subject, past court decisions helped to determine how to define
these elusive terms. Jackson v. Wickha 9 was one of the most decisive
cases in solving the problem. The court stated that they felt that where
a case had been properly submitted to a jury and a verdict fairly
rendered, this verdict should be given great weight in determining
whether or not it should be set aside. They felt that unless manifest
injustice had been done, or unless the verdict was plainly not warranted
by the evidence, the jury verdict must stand.
If there is:
1. A conflict of testimony on a material point or;
2. If reasonable fair-minded men may differ as to the conclusions
of fact to be drawn from the evidence or;
3. If the conclusion is dependent upon the weight to be given the
testimony;
then the verdict of the jury is final and conclusive and cannot be dis-
turbed by either the trial court or the Supreme Court of Appeals.'0 It is
not enough that there is a great preponderance of the evidence against
the verdict, or that the judge, had he been on the jury, would have de-
cided differently. There must be an obvious deviation from right and
justice before a court will be justified in setting aside a jury's verdict."
In the aforestated list of factors, it was stated that if the conclusion was
dependent upon the weight to be given to the testimony, then the jury
verdict must stand. In a recent Virginia case, Cloutier v. Virginia Gas
Distribution Corporation,2 it was decided that in determining whether
the verdict was contrary to the evidence (or without evidence to sup-
port it), that the court must to some extent, pass on the weight of the
evidence. The court does not, however, sit as a jury and it is not the
court's duty to pass on the preponderance of the evidence. Also the court
may not set aside a verdict supported by testimony of which there is no
reason to discredit. 13 Exactly how far may the court go in determining
whether the jury's verdict is contrary to the evidence or without evi-
dence to support it? There is no statement defining the exact limit to
which the trial court or the Supreme Court of Appeals may go, but it has
9. 112 Va. 128, 70 S.E. 539 (1911).
10. BuRKs, PLEADING AND PRAcriCm 609 (4th ed. 1952).
11. Sydnor & Huntley v. Bonifant, 158 Va. 703, 164 S.E. 403 (1932).
12. 202 Va. 646, 119 S.E.2d 234 (1961).
13. McOuown v. Phaup, 172 Va. 419,2 S.E.2d 330 (1939).
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been agreed that the verdict of the jury is entitled to great weight and
respect. Though the court may have overruled a prior motion to strike
the evidence, when reviewing the evidence on a motion to set aside the
verdict because contrary to the evidence (or without evidence to sup-
port it), the court may disregard the evidence if it is clearly incon-
sistent or incredible. It may best be summed up by stating that the
Virginia Courts usually will not set aside a jury's verdict unless it ap-
pears to be ". . . 'plainly against the weight of the evidence', meaning
'palpably erroneous' or 'without sufficient evidence'; or 'against the
evidence', practically synonymous terms alternately used in the decided
cases." 14
I. WHEN SHOULD THE COURT ENTER FINAL JUDGMENT ON A
MOTION To SET ASIDE THE VERDICT UNDER 8-352?
According to the statute, "... a new trial shall not be granted if there
is sufficient evidence before the court to enable it to decide the case
upon its merits, but such final judgment shall be entered as to the court
shall seem right and proper." 15 In most of the cases passing on the ques-
tion since the statute was enacted, no distinction has been drawn between
the power of the court to set aside a verdict and grant a new trial and
that of setting aside the verdict and entering final judgment. So in de-
termining whether to grant a new trial or to enter a final judgment, the
court does not look at the evidence as it would on a demurrer to the
evidence. Instead the court will examine the evidence as it would on
a motion to strike, and will examine it as a whole and will to some extent,
have to pass on the weight of the evidence. The Virginia Courts have
tended to allow more latitude in setting aside a verdict and granting a
new trial, than in setting aside a verdict and entering a final judgment.
This latitude results from the fact that a new trial will merely leave
the question to another jury, while a final judgment constitutes a de-
cision on the merits and ends the action. Therefore, it would seem that
before a Virginia Court would set aside a verdict and enter final judg-
ment, they would have to be assured of two things. The first being that
the party whose verdict is being set aside has clearly failed to prove his
case, and secondly that he probably could not do so if he was provided
another trial.16 In compliance with the statute, the Court must determine
14. Cardwell v. Norfolk & W.R. Co., 114 Va. 500, 77 S.E. 612 (1913).
15. VA. CODE ANN. § 8-352 (1950) (Replacement Volume 1957).
16. Buius, PEADING AND PRAcncE 615 (4th ed. 1952).
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whether there is sufficient evidence for a decision on the merits to be
reached; for if there is not, then the party must be granted a new trial.
This section is the heart of 8-352 and by proper use has been of great
aid both to lawyers and to the judicial system. For it has as its creators
envisioned, eliminated unnecessary delays and expenses of a second
trial when one is uncalled for. No longer is the motion to set aside the
verdict because contrary to the evidence (or without evidence to support
it) a mere device for obtaining a new trial. It now serves as a method to
guarantee a speedy end to litigation, which before had served only to
bog down the judicial system.
IV. POWER OF THE COURT To IMPANEL A JURY To ASSESS DAMAGEs
"If necessary to assess damages which have not been assessed, the
court may impanel a jury at its bar to make such assessment, and then
enter such final judgment." 17
In Ki'n v. Bembury,8 a 1935 Virginia case, it was stated that the
trial court had been granted the express power to set aside a verdict and
confine the issues to be tried, to the quantum of damages, in a proper
case under section 8-352. Though this power is expressly granted by
the Code, the Virginia Courts have been extremely hesitant to use it.
The reason behind this hesitancy is the question of a proper distinction
between liability and the amount of damages. The judges seem to feel
that only rarely will the questions of inadequacy or adequacy of
damages and of liability be so distinct that a new trial or a jury assess-
ment after verdict set aside and before final entered, could be limited to
the issue of damages, and not prejudice one of the parties to the suit.19
In a 1934 Virginia case,2 the members of the Supreme Court of Appeals
set down their views on the subject of a new trial or assessment at the
bar before final judgment, limiting them to the question of damages. In
this case the plaintiff brought suit against the defendant for both personal
property injuries sustained by her in an automobile accident, which
she claimed was a result of defendant's negligence. At the close of
plaintiff's evidence, defendant made a motion to strike on the grounds
that the evidence offered showed that plaintiff's driver was guilty of
negligence chargeable to plaintiff, which contributed to the causes of
the accident. This motion was overruled. After excepting, defendant
17. VA. CODE ANN. § 8-352 (1950) (Replacement Volume 1957).
18. 163 Va. 891, 178 S.E. 53 (1935).
19. Note, New Trial On the Issue of Damages In Virginia, 41 VA. L. REv. 269 (1955).
20. Rawle v. McIlhenny, 163 Va. 735, 177 S.E. 214 (1934).
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proceeded to introduce evidence on his behalf. At the conclusion of
introduction of evidence by both parties, defendant did not renew his
motion to strike. The case was submitted to the jury and a verdict of
$1500 was awarded the plaintiff. No motion to set aside was made by
the defendant, but plaintiff so moved on the grounds that the damages
were inadequate and insufficient in amount. The court granted the plain-
tiff's motion over the defendant's protests and empaneled a jury to
assess the damages. This jury returned a verdict assessing the damages
at $5000. Defendant moved to set aside this verdict. The Supreme
Court of Appeals upheld the verdict stating that the right of plaintiff
to have a verdict in his favor set aside over defendant's objection on the
grounds of inadequacy of damages, did not depend solely upon evidence
of damage he had suffered. Both the cause for the return of an inade-
quate verdict and the state of evidence relative to liability of defendant,
have a bearing on the right of plaintiff to have a favorable verdict set
aside for inadequacy. The court goes on to list five classifications turning
upon the evidence relating to the liability of the defendant. The five
classes they established were,
Where:
1. Evidence is insufficient to support a verdict adverse to defendant.
2. Evidence is insufficient to sustain a verdict finding defendant
not liable.
3. Preponderance of evidence is against plaintiff's right to recover,
though there is evidence to support a verdict against the de-
fendant.
4. Preponderance of evidence is in favor of plaintiff's recovery
but there is evidence to support verdict finding defendant not
liable.
5. Conflicting evidence-no preponderance-evidence is sufficient
to support a verdict in favor of either.
Classifications I and 3 are almost unanimously accepted as situations
where the court would refuse to set aside a verdict on grounds of in-
adequacy; 2, 4, and 5 are situations where the courts agree a verdict
may be set aside for inadequacy and a new trial limited to damages. So it
would seem that under 8-352 the court might well in situations 2, 4, and
5 set aside the verdict and empanel a jury at its bar to assess the damages
before entering final judgment. In the exercise of this power, however,
the court must make certain that the jury's misconduct or misconception
Vol. 6:216
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from which the inadequacy of the verdict resulted, has not extended to
its determination of liability.
The Rawles case seemed to settle the law in Virginia on the question
of the power of the court to set aside a verdict and limit the issue to the
question of damages. In 1952, however, members of the Virginia Bar
received notice that this question was still unanswered. In the case of
Wright v. Estep,21 a motion to set aside the verdict and limit the question
to damages was overruled. The Court said that the damages were sub-
stantial but inadequate, and that a new trial must be held on all the issues;
since it appeared from the verdict that the jury was materially influenced
by the issue of liability. This decision was in direct conflict with the
Rawles case, where the motion was upheld and the question limited to
that of damages. Here the Court also said that the damages were sub-
stantial but inadequate, but that merely because there was no preponder-
ance of evidence, either way was not sufficient reason to require a retrial
of all issues.
The two cases cannot be reconciled. The only conclusion to be drawn
is that in Virginia, the doctrine of allowing the Court to empanel a jury
at its bar to assess damages, has been seriously restrained. This doctrine
seems meritorious and its use should be encouraged rather than dis-
couraged. It was meant to curb the expense and delay of an unnecessary
second trial on all the issues, and if the circumstances indicate its use,
counsel while being mindful of the restraints placed upon it, should not
hesitate to use it in the best interests of his client.
V. WHEN A NEW TRIAL SHOULD BE GRANTED
A new trial shall not be granted if there is sufficient evidence
before the court to enable it to decide the case upon its merits, ... " 22
From the very words of this statute it is obvious that a new trial will
be granted only if there is insufficient evidence to enable a decision on
the merits. If the evidence is insufficient, section 8-352 should not be
invoked, and if the motion is made for final judgment the trial court
must overrule the motion.23 In the case of Kirn v. Bembury,2 4 defendant
was estopped by a statutory rule from obtaining the benefit of evidence,
introduced without objection, which proved his innocence. In consider-
ing the motion to set aside under 8-352, the court stated that:
21. 194 Va. 332, 73 S.E.2d 371 (1952).
22. VA. CODE ANN. § 8-352 (1950) (Replacement Volume 1957).
23. Branning Mfg. Co. v. Norfolk-Southern R. Co, 138 Va. 43, 121 S.E. 74 (1924).
24. 163 Va. 891, 178"S.E. 53 (1935).
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When the record shows that because of an inadvertent failure of de-
fendant to comply with some technical rule of procedure he has been
estopped from fully developing the question of his liability, there is
not sufficient evidence, within the meaning of the statute, before the
Court to enable it to pass upon the 'merits of the case'. 25
The Court then went on to say that if the verdict should be set aside
under such circumstances, the issues submitted to another jury should
not be limited to the question of damages. Then too, if the motion is
made to set aside, and no request is made for final judgment, the Court
is not denied the right to enter a final order, but it should make sure it
is a proper case.
Though the granting of a new trial on all the issues by a motion to
set aside under 8-352 does not fulfill its prime purpose (that of obtaining
a speedy end to costly litigation), many times the motion under 8-352
will result in this end. For the Courts in Virginia have tended to "be
sure" before entering a final judgment under this statute.
VI. EFFECT OF THIs SECTION ON APPEAL
The familiar maxim, "a jury's verdict is entitled to great weight and
respect", is evident in the cases brought before the courts on appeals
from decrees rendered under 8-352.
In a recent Virginia case the fact that a verdict which has been dis-
approved by the trial judge is not entitled to the same weight as one
that has been approved by him, was reiterated. 26 With the great weight
and respect given a jury's verdict added to the approval of the trial
court, the appellate court is in a position which requires that in almost
every case, the verdict be upheld.27 In considering a verdict on appeal,
the appellate court must proceed under section 8-491 of the Virginia
Code.28 When read in connection with 8-352, this section clearly refers
to a judgment in support of a jury verdict.
25. 1d. at 904.
26. Cloutier, Adm'r v. Gas. Corp., 202 Va. 646, 119 S.E.2d 234 (1961).
27. Holloman v. Com., 138 Va. 758, 120 S.E. 852 (1934).
28. VA. CoDE ANN. § 8-491 (1950) (Replacement Volume 1957). When in a case
at law, civil or criminal, is tried by a jury and a party excepts to the judgment or action
of the court in granting or refusing to grant a new trial on a motion to set aside the
verdict of a jury on the ground that it is contrary to the evidence, or when a case at
law is decided by a court or judge without the intervention of a jury and a party excepts
to the decision on the ground that, it is contrary to the evidence and the evidence, not
the facts is certified, the judgment of the trial court shall not be set aside unless it
[Vol. 6:216
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If on appeal, it is found that the trial court improperly set aside the
verdict, it will be reinstated by the appellate court.29 If a new trial was
granted under 8-352, and no appeal was taken, and at the close of the
second trial a motion under 8-352 was made, and thence appealed; what
position will the appellate court take? The Virginia Supreme Court
of Appeals answered this question in the case of Hogg v. Plant. There
Judge Burks said:
.. we have adopted as a rule of practice what was formerly provided
by section 3-484 of the Code of 1887, that when there have been two
trials in the lower court we will look first to the evidence and pro-
ceedings on the first trial, and if we discover that the court erred in
setting aside the verdict on that trial, we will set aside and annul all
proceedings subsequent to the said verdict and enter judgment there-
on.3 0
VII. IN SUMMARY
That part of the Virginia Code now known as section 8-3 52, has led a
long and useful life since its inception in 1919. From the question of its
constitutional validity to the question of how far the court may go in
examining the evidence on a motion to set aside under it, the statute has
grown. It has admirably fulfilled the expectations of its creators. It
serves as a worthwhile adjunct to the modern motion to strike the evi-
dence and is still aiding the Virginia legal system in avoiding the un-
necessary delays and expenses of a second trial.
It seems to the author that the Virginia Courts have used 8-352 to
its full advantage with one important exception. The courts have been
extremely hesitant to use the power conferred by this statute in respect
to the question of damages. This hesitancy has only served to impede the
advantages incurred by the proper use of the powers granted under the
statute. Merely because liability is not clear cut and the damages awarded
are inadequate is not sufficient reason to refuse to use the power granted
under 8-352. If both the jury and the trial court feel that the question
of liability has been fairly decided, why shouldn't a new trial be limited
to the question of damages? It is the author's hope that in the future
appears from the evidence that such judgment is plainly wrong or without evidence
to support it.
29. Gregory v. Seaboard Airline R. Co., 142 Va. 750, 128 S.E. 272 (1925).
30. 145 Va. 175, 182, 133 S.E. 759 (1926); accord Eubank v. Hayden, 202 Va. 634,
119 S.E.2d 328 (1961).
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the Virginia Courts will not shy away from the power to limit the ques-
tion to that of damages; but will fully utilize this power which will
result in the desired effect of avoiding unnecessary and costly litigation.
Only then will the Virginia Court system receive the full benefits
granted both to them and the citizens of Virginia, by the Revisors of
the Virginia Code in 1919 in adopting statute 8-352.
Gregory U. Evans
